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The case for a more ready resort to derogations from the ECHR in 
the current ‘war on terror’  
Professor Helen Fenwick, Durham University  
Dr Daniel Fenwick, Northumbria University 
Abstract 
Over the last 4/5 years the terrorist threat faced by the contracting states of the ECHR has 
intensified and become more widespread. The threat has come to a significant extent from their 
own citizens, and since suspect nationals usually cannot be deported, it might have been 
expected that detention or control measures, requiring derogations under art.15 ECHR, would 
have been put in place. It is therefore of interest to note that very few derogations have been 
sought, despite the recent very significant rise in terrorist activity. This piece asks why 
derogations have not played a pivotal role in the current ‘war on terror’, and connects the 
answer to some of the advantages of relying on derogations as opposed to exploring alternative 
ways of evading the ECHR guarantees. It argues that derogations are not currently playing the 
role envisaged for them by the founders of the ECHR, and that there is a case for resorting to 
reliance on them more readily in the current situation.  
 
1. Introduction  
 
Over the last 4/5 years the terrorist threat faced by the contracting states of the ECHR has 
intensified and become more widespread. The threat has come to a significant extent from their 
own citizens, whether from the far right or from jihadist Islamist groups. Since suspect 
nationals usually cannot be deported, it might have been expected that detention or control 
measures, requiring derogations under art.15 ECHR, would have been put in place in a number 
of the states. It is therefore of interest to note that very few derogations have been sought, 
despite the recent very significant rise in terrorist activity. At the present moment only one 
derogation is in place in the contracting states, in Turkey. 
 
This piece asks why derogations have not played a pivotal role in the current ‘war on terror’, 
and connects the answer to some of the advantages of relying on derogations as opposed to 
exploring alternative ways of evading the ECHR guarantees. It argues that derogations are not 
currently playing the role envisaged for them by the founders of the ECHR, and that there is a 




2. Methods of evading or minimising ECHR guarantees absent a derogation 
 
The threat from ISIS-supporting nationals and from the far-right in ECHR contracting states 
has led them to consider and introduce an increasing array of counter-terror measures, 
including non-trial-based measures, creating tensions with human rights norms. If the terrorism 
threat comes from a states’ own citizens, they have to be retained within its borders (with some 
exceptions), prompting the search for counter-terror measures that can be used to control their 
activities. But such measures may come into conflict with the ECHR guarantees, in particular 
that of the right to liberty under art.5. If no derogation from art.5 or other derogable Articles is 
sought, other methods of evading their strictures may be explored.  
 
One such method takes the form of liberty-invading non-trial-based executive measures. 
Clearly, such measures tend to be in tension with domestic and international human rights law, 
but they have often been presented as reconcilable with them, via down-grading recalibrations 
of human rights, as was necessitated by control orders, and similar measures, which have 
recently spread from the UK to other contracting states. The UK was the first European state 
to introduce such measures, but recently, as pointed out by Amnesty International1 in a report 
concerning counter-terror measures in 14 European countries, a number of other Member 
States have followed suit, or are about to do so. The Report found that the adoption of various 
legislative measures has resulted in a downgrading of safeguards for rights to privacy, 
expression and liberty across Europe, disproportionate to the terrorist threat.2 The Report noted 
that “In a number of states, emergency measures that are supposed to be temporary have 
become embedded in ordinary criminal law” contrary to the temporarily and operationally 
limited understanding of derogations in the context of the ECHR and other international human 
rights instruments. The Report highlighted the specific issue of control orders and related 
measures,3 the use of citizen-stripping measures, and measures that temporarily exclude 
suspected foreign fighters from the country, mentioned below.4  
 
                                                 
1 Amnesty International, Europe: Dangerously disproportionate: The ever-expanding 
national security state in Europe (17 January 2017). 
2 Amnesty International, Europe: Dangerously disproportionate, p.19. 
3 Amnesty International, Europe: Dangerously disproportionate, pp 48-56. 
4 Amnesty International, Europe: Dangerously disproportionate, pp 62-63. 
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As is well known, in the UK after the decision in A and others5, a further non-trial-based 
measure emerged unaccompanied by a derogation in the form of control orders applicable to 
suspect nationals and non-nationals alike under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA). 
Control orders, and the measure that replaced them in the UK in 2011 - Terrorism Prevention 
and Investigation Orders (TPIMs) - are non-trial-based executive measures which have 
provided the model for the introduction of such measures in a number of the ECHR contracting 
states in Europe. The 2017 Amnesty report criticised “the regional trend [in Europe] of using 
such measures instead of charging and prosecuting people in the criminal justice system”. 6 In 
the UK they are imposed by the Home Secretary, with court review, on a low standard of proof 
and enable individuals to be subjected to significant restrictions on liberty, including house 
detention, but not to imprisonment.  Measures on the control orders model rely on targeting 
terrorist suspects to curtail their liberty without the need for a criminal trial, by imposing 
specific restrictions on them, related to the particular types of activity it is thought that they 
might engage in (due to previous behaviour), with the aim of preventing future terrorist activity 
before it occurs.  
 
Control orders as non-trial-based counter-terror measures were designed to approach or 
possibly over-step the limits of human rights’ law, in particular of the substantive rights to 
liberty under art.5 ECHR, to private life under art.8 and to a fair trial under art.6. The courts 
were impliedly required to reinterpret art.5 in a minimising fashion in relation to the content of 
control orders and to do the same in respect of art.6 in respect of the process of reviewing them. 
Minimising human rights via reinterpretation, rather than openly departing from them via a 
derogation, implies that a re-balancing between societal needs and individual rights should 
occur, in effect emptying the right of part of its content.  
 
But in response the courts relied on art.5 and 6 ECHR to bring the control orders scheme into 
closer compliance with their demands, meaning that the scheme itself became in various 
respects, less repressive. However, the courts also partially acquiesced in the notion of finding 
that the ECHR could accommodate the scheme by accepting somewhat recalibrated versions 
of art.5 and 6. Thus reconciliation with human rights law was achieved by relying on a degree 
of recalibration of the rights, although not of the extensive nature demanded by the initial 
                                                 
5 A and others v SSHD (2004) UKHL 56. 
6 Amnesty International, Europe: Dangerously disproportionate, p.48. 
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iteration of the scheme. In other states schemes on the control orders model are being 
introduced, without being covered by a derogation. So it is worth considering whether such 
schemes do necessitate a derogation, due to the damage done to certain Strasbourg concepts if 
they are introduced and operated without one.  
 
A further means of evading the ECHR guarantees arises via a citizenship-deprivation order. 
Reliance on citizenship deprivation to protect security is currently being introduced and 
explored in a range of democracies, including the ECHR-contracting states. If a terrorist 
suspect is stripped of citizenship and deported to a non-ECHR state (or is already in that state 
when the citizenship-deprivation occurs) he/she cannot – or is less likely to be able to – rely on 
the ECHR against the depriving state. Use of citizenship-stripping has become much more 
prevalent in Europe (and globally) recently as an aspect of the escalating war on terror and 
offers another means of evading ECHR safeguards without seeking a derogation.  
 
But states have not sought to issue citizen deprivation orders against mono-nationals who are 
suspected terrorists even when facing an influx of foreign terrorist fighter returnees, and even 
in the face of the terrorist attacks and plots in Europe in 2015-18. In the UK, citizenship can be 
stripped from a national if their actions are “seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the 
UK”, and they are a dual national, or “the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds for 
believing that the person is able, under the law of a country or territory outside the UK, to 
become a national of such a country or territory” under the British Nationality Act 19817. 
Therefore persons covered by those provisions can be stripped of citizenship and have their 
passports withdrawn while inside or outside the UK.  
 
In France, the Constitutional Reform Bill 2016 considered measures for removing citizenship 
from French mono-nationals who were convicted as terrorists in the wake of the 2015 Paris 
attacks; while a clear majority of MPs in the lower House of Parliament approved the measures, 
they were ultimately abandoned. Dual nationals convicted on terror charges in Belgium face 
losing their  Belgian citizenship, while Bulgaria, Denmark, Macedonia, the 
Netherlands, Romania and Spain have similar laws. 
 
                                                 
7 s.40(4A), (s4A(c)) after amendment by the Immigration Act 2014 s.66). 
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The UK has also introduced temporary exclusion orders under the Counter-terrorism and 
Security Act 2015, which reportedly have already been used, sparingly. They operate on the 
basis that while the TEO subject is outside the UK he/she is outside the UK’s ECHR 
jurisdictional competence. Therefore, if that position is correct, the state which has control over 
the suspect at the time when the TEO is imposed, not the UK, is responsible for any violations 
of the ECHR that occur. 
 
It is arguable that a reluctance to seek to rely on a derogation may have prompted an exploration 
of these other methods of evading the ECHR - which in some instances would also allow 
evasion of non-derogable rights. If so, that would support the case for resort to derogations 
more readily, the point pursued further below.  
 
3. The contrasting role of derogations in the UK, France and Turkey in the 
‘war on terror’ 
 
For the purposes of the argument being put forward in this piece, it is argued that some lessons 
can be learnt from the use of derogations in the UK, France and Turkey in the current ‘war on 
terror’.  
 
As is well known, in the UK, immediately post-9/11, reconciliation between reliance on a non-
trial-based measure and human rights law was sought by use of a derogation from art.5 ECHR 
in 2001. That reconciliation failed since detention without trial under Part 4 Anti-Terrorism 
Crime and Security Act 2001 (ACTSA) for non-national terrorist suspects was abandoned, 
after the House of Lords invalidated the derogation in A and others on grounds of 
proportionality, and the Strasbourg Court later confirmed that finding.  
 
In A v UK8, the first test under art.15 was found to be satisfied – it was accepted, conceding a 
wide margin of appreciation to the state, that an emergency had been in being. But the 
Strasbourg Court then went on to consider whether the Part 4 measures had been strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation. The Court reiterated that when it comes to consider 
a derogation under art.15, it allows the national authorities a wide margin of appreciation to 
decide on the nature and scope of the derogating measures necessary to avert the emergency, 
                                                 
8 A v UK (2009) 49 E.H.R.R. 29. 
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but stated that it was ultimately for the Court to rule whether the measures were “strictly 
required”. The Court found that it had not been provided with any evidence which could 
persuade it to depart from the conclusion of the House of Lords that the difference in treatment 
between suspect nationals and non-nationals was unjustified, so the measures were not found 
to be strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.  
 
The derogation relied on by France in 2015 may be contrasted with the one in the UK on a 
number of grounds; it did not create discrimination on grounds of nationality; it was introduced 
in the wake of terrorist attacks on French soil, and it was abandoned by the government after 2 
years. France instituted a number of emergency measures (etat d'urgence) in 2015 after the 
Paris attacks accompanied by a derogation under art.15 ECHR. The Constitutional Reform Bill 
(to create changes to art.16 and 36) came before the Senate in France on 10 February 2016 and 
a clear majority of MPs in the lower House of Parliament approved the measures. They were 
intended to enshrine the state of emergency powers into the constitution, allowing a 
government to call on the powers in a time of crisis. The expanded emergency powers allowed 
the government to: impose immediate house arrest without authorization from a judge, if 
persons were considered a risk; impose traffic restrictions, and prohibitions on public assembly; 
to order closure of public spaces; power to requisition property; prohibition of entry into or 
residence of certain persons; conduct searches without a judicial warrant and seize any 
computer files found, and to block websites deemed to glorify terrorism, without prior judicial 
authorization. These powers created interferences with the rights to liberty, security, freedom 
of movement, privacy, and freedoms of association and expression and so required the 
derogation under art.15. The length of the state of emergency was criticised by Amnesty 
International, but France eventually abandoned the derogation on 1 November 2017.  
 
Turkey’s recent reliance on a derogation contrasts strongly with that of France in a range of 
respects. A group of members of the Turkish armed forces attempting to seize power in Istanbul 
on 15 to 16 July 2016. The attempted coup involved soldiers in an attack on several key State 
buildings, including Parliament and the Presidential compound; the Chief of General Staff was 
captured and taken as a hostage.9 It was reported that more than 300 people were killed during 
the coup and 2,500 people were injured. The Turkish government alleged that the coup attempt 
was linked to Fetullah Gülen and allegedly master-minded by the Gulenist terrorist group; on 
                                                 
9 Mehmet Hasan Altan v Turkey (App. No.13237/17), judgment of 20 March 2018 at [15]. 
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21 July 2016 the government declared a national state of emergency pursuant to art.120 of the 
Turkish Constitution of 1982 to last for three months, which has subsequently been extended. 
Subsequently Turkey formally notified the Council of Europe that it intended to derogate from 
the ECHR under art.15 but, unusually, no specific measure was identified in the notice, such 
as detention without trial, and no Article of the Convention was identified as having been 
derogated from.10  
 
In two cases in 2018, Mehmet and Sahin v Turkey11 the Strasbourg Court found that “the 
attempted military coup and its aftermath have posed severe dangers to the democratic 
constitutional order and human rights, amounting to a threat to the life of the nation” and, 
noting the broad margin of appreciation accorded to the state in relation to the judgement that 
such a threat existed, accepted that the derogation was relevant to its assessment of the merits 
of the applicant’s complaint.12 The Court in Mehmet and in Sahin reaffirmed the approach to 
the margin of appreciation and the stance taken as to the question of whether the measures 
taken were ‘strictly required’ in A and others v UK. Mehmet and Sahin were both journalists 
critical of the government. Both applicants were subject to criminal proceedings on the basis 
of contravention of art.309 of the Criminal Code – attempting to overthrow the constitutional 
order – due to their alleged connections and sympathies with the Gulenist movement, despite 
there being no evidence linking them to the coup attempt, or to active participation in the 
movement. Mehmet had been held in pre-trial detention for over a year prior to being sentenced 
to life imprisonment (subject to ongoing appeals) and Sahin had been held for a similar period, 
although his trial had yet to be heard at the time of the Court judgment. Both Mehmet and Sahin 
involved claims of compensation for a lengthy period of pre-trial detention. The Turkish 
Constitutional Court, taking a stance similar to that of the House of Lords in the UK in A and 
others, had also accepted that there was a ‘public emergency’ within the terms of art.15, but 
had also gone on to find that that the measures were not strictly required by the exigencies of 
the situation. Since the derogation was found to be invalid domestically, a violation of the 
applicants’ art.5(1) rights was found in both cases.  
 
The Court of Human Rights had regard to these findings. Unlike A and others, however, in 
which the UK’s derogation referred to specific measures of pre-trial detention, in Mehmet and 
                                                 
10 Mehmet (App. No.13237/17) at [81]. 
11 Sahin Alpay v Turkey (App. No.16538/17), judgment of 20 March 2018. 
12 Mehmet (App. No.13237/17) at [92]; Sahin (App. No.16538/17) at [76]. 
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Sahin the derogation did not refer to such measures. Another crucial distinction is that in 
Mehmet and Sahin there was limited evidence that the two applicants had had any involvement 
in terrorist activity, and therefore the Court found that the pre-trial detention was not “lawful”, 
nor effected “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” due to the lack of reasonable 
suspicion, and thus could not ‘be said to have been strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation’.13 So the derogation was not found to justify the treatment of the applicants in Sahin 
or Mehmet, as the measures taken were not “strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”. 
The Court thus found violations of art.5. In this regard the European Court agreed with the 
Constitutional Court’s finding in relation to art.5(1) that “if it were accepted that people could 
be placed in pre-trial detention without any strong evidence that they had committed an offence, 
the guarantees of the right to liberty and security would be meaningless”. 14 
 
In Mehmet and in Sahin the Court of Human Rights also considered the question whether the 
interference with the applicants’ art.10 (freedom of expression) rights was justified as a 
measure ‘strictly necessary’ due to the exigencies of the situation. This issue was raised because 
the imposition of pre-trial detention had been linked explicitly to both applicants’ critical 
statements about the government in relation to the events leading up to and in response to the 
coup. The Court considered that:  
 
…even in a state of emergency – which is, as the Constitutional Court noted, a legal 
regime whose aim is to restore the normal regime by guaranteeing fundamental rights… 
the Contracting States must bear in mind that any measures taken should seek to protect 
the democratic order from the threats to it, and every effort must be made to safeguard 
the values of a democratic society, such as pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness.15   
 
The Court observed that detention of journalists in part for publication of articles and providing 
commentary created a ‘chilling effect’ on the press. The Court therefore found a violation of 
art.10 in both cases. The Court awarded non-pecuniary compensation to the victims due to the 
lack of evidence that either applicant was associated with terrorism or otherwise with violent 
opposition to the state. The applicants in Mehmet and Sahin were granted €21,500 in non-
pecuniary damages.  
                                                 
13 Mehmet (App. No.13237/17) at [140]; Sahin (App. No.16538/17) at [119].  
14 Mehmet (App. No.13237/17) at [36]; Sahin (App. No.16538/17) at [32].  




It is clear that the actions taken in Turkey, including arresting and imprisoning thousands of 
academics, civil servants and journalists, could not be covered by a derogation from arts 5 or 
10, as the Strasbourg Court found in the 2018 cases considered, because they are clearly 
disproportionate to the threat in question. So it appears that Turkey is no longer adhering to the 
ECHR in a range of respects, and although it has openly declared that that is the case via the 
derogation, its engagement with the demands of art.15, and of the ECHR in general, may be 
viewed as a tokenistic one. The situation is precisely the one that art.15 was designed to avoid. 
So while the vast majority of the ECHR-contracting states have not sought a derogation in the 
face of the ‘war on terror’, the only derogation currently in existence in a contracting state 
relates instead to an attempted internal coup and shows little allegiance to ECHR values.  
 
4. Why have states largely avoided reliance on derogations? 
 
If further states had sought derogations in the last five years from art.5 to cover detention 
without trial, or to introduce lengthy periods of house arrest likely to create a ‘deprivation of 
liberty’, the Strasbourg Court would have been likely to uphold them, provided the measures 
were compatible with the state’s other international legal obligations, depending on the precise 
measures introduced, given the relative ease with which it is possible to satisfy the 
jurisprudence governing the tests under art.15. The Court has tended to defer to the state’s 
judgment as to the existence of a state of emergency (the first question under art.15). Initially 
it appeared, as evidenced in certain decisions, such as Brannigan and McBride v UK,16 that the 
Court would take the view that the margin of appreciation conceded would not differ in respect 
of the second question regarding proportionality. So the margin of appreciation conceded at 
Strasbourg on the ‘emergency’ point meant that it was hard to challenge the state’s view as to 
the measures needed to combat the threat, and in most cases, until recently, once the emergency 
point was conceded, so was the point as to the measures needed to combat the emergency. But 
in more recent cases – Aksoy v Turkey17, A and others v UK - a change in that stance became 
apparent and the margin appears to have narrowed at the second step, enabling the Court to 
come to a judgment differing from that of the member state. That stance was then confirmed 
in Sahin Alpay v Turkey and Mehmet Hasan Altan v Turkey in 2018. The Court is showing a 
                                                 
16 Brannigan and McBride v UK (1994) 17 E.H.R.R. 539. 
17 Aksoy v Turkey (1997) 23 E.H.R.R. 553. 
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greater determination to scrutinise the measures taken; it is subjecting them to a more intensive 
review, having reduced the margin conceded on this issue. A divide between the width of the 
margin conceded as to making a determination as to an ‘emergency’ and the margin conceded 
regarding the proportionality analysis is apparent. 
 
It is possible that the reluctance of the contracting states to seek derogations from the ECHR 
post 9/11, even in the face of the increase in terrorist activity in Europe in 2015-18, may have 
been influenced by the diminished deference shown in the case of A v UK (and perhaps to a 
lesser extent by that of Aksoy v Turkey, in which the measures also failed the proportionality 
test). That stance of the Strasbourg Court, evident in A and others in 2004, and its counterpart 
decision at Strasbourg in 2010, may have sent a signal to the other states that use of derogations 
can be risky and – since they may be invalidated - de-stabilising to counter-terror efforts. If, 
combined with reluctance to rely on a derogation, other methods of evading or minimising the 
ECHR guarantees are available, the basis for seeking a derogation could appear to be 
undermined. Clearly, that suggestion must be treated with caution since if no derogation is in 
place, counter-terror measures can be tested directly against the standards maintained under the 
relevant ECHR guarantees, which can also be de-stabilising to counter terror efforts. But the 
perception that derogations are of value to the member states in aiding in combatting terrorism 
appears to have undergone some revision, and it would be strange if that was not connected to 
the recent adoption of stricter scrutiny of proportionality under art.15 at Strasbourg.  
 
A further reason for a reluctance to seek a derogation in the member states may be due to fear 
of reputational damage and of handing a propaganda victory to ISIS and similar groups. If the 
‘war on terror’ relies on maintenance of a moral difference between a state and terrorist groups 
that threaten it, then an announcement that human rights are to be partially abandoned may 
appear to fail to aid that enterprise. The risk that a derogation might be invalidated would add 
a further concern: unsuccessful reliance on a derogation, as found in A v UK, would create even 
greater reputational damage.  
 
5. The case for resorting to derogations more readily  
 
Although the risk of terror attacks may be over-stated by governments and the media, and the 
human rights of suspects can be portrayed as needlessly interfering with a state’s ability to 
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combat terrorism, that has not led in the last five years to a rush in most of the contracting states 
to deploy derogations to introduce the most draconian measures. The existence of a state of 
emergency is a necessary precondition for derogation – it does not mandate it, and a state which 
seeks to adhere to the Convention, despite the fact that it could probably defend a derogation 
at Strasbourg, may be said to deserve credit for doing so. However, if in the absence of a 
derogation other methods of evading the ECHR are resorted to, the option of openly declaring 
that certain ECHR standards are not being maintained, on a temporary basis, may create less 
damage to human rights in the long run. In other words, if art.15 is relied on in a manner that 
takes its demands seriously, and with a view to returning to normal human rights standards as 
quickly as possible, as was arguably the case in France (and reiterated in Mehmet and in Sahin), 
resort to a derogation may have advantages over more stealthy departures from rights’ 
standards. 
 
So it is argued that current counter-terrorism debate needs to consider more openly the impact 
of non-trial-based liberty-invading measures as one aspect of the solution to the current terrorist 
threat in order to question whether there is a case for openly seeking a derogation to protect 
such measures. It should be asked whether, given the principles underlying the current 
conception of international human rights law, the cost of relying on such measures without a 
derogation from art.5 is out of proportion to their value, since in particular they tend to lead to 
recalibration of the concept of ‘deprivation of liberty’. There is a case for contending that such 
measures should be covered by a derogation, which also requires that they should be non-
discriminatory and proportionate to the specific threat emanating from members and supporters 
of ISIS and similar groups, as well as from far-right secular groups. In general, reliance on a 
derogation is more transparent than relying on the other methods considered here of reconciling 
such measures with human rights law, and less likely to lead to normalisation of such measures. 
A derogation must be openly declared and therefore is less insidious in eroding rights-
adherence than the stealthy avoidance of human rights laws via recalibrations of rights or by 
seeking to place suspects outside the area of a state’s jurisdictional responsibility.  
 
Use of a derogation would also show respect for the mechanisms international human rights 
law has provided for crisis situations, for use even against a state’s own citizens. Availability 
of derogations under the ECHR (and other international human rights’ instruments) means that 
states are encouraged, even when facing crisis situations, to remain within the ECHR system 
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rather than considering withdrawal. But the derogation is still policed by the Court, and, as 
seen in Aksoy, A v UK, Mehmet and Sahin, is not always accepted.  
 
Reliance on derogations when a state is or perceives itself to be in a state of emergency arguably 
means that the actions of the state still retain legitimacy (including satisfying the needs of 
transparency) since it can only derogate to the extent, and for the period of time, that will satisfy 
the demands of proportionality under art.15, and that judgment is likely ultimately to be made 
by the Strasbourg Court. If a derogation was continued after the point when the state of 
emergency had diminished those demands would not continue to be satisfied. But reliance on 
derogations means adhering to transparency and proportionality as demanded by art.15 – the 
converse of the current position Turkey appears to be in in relation to art.15 and the ECHR in 
general. Turkey has purported to remain within the Convention system by relying on a 
derogation, but the connection between the emergency caused by the attempted military coup 
and the widespread arrest and detention of journalists, academics and others apparently linked 
to Gulenism is not apparent. Even if it was apparent, such arrests would not be viewed as a 
proportionate response to the emergency, while the purported derogation appeared to be 
intended to obscure rather than reveal adherence to the ECHR. 
 
6. Conclusions 
   
Despite these advantages of use of derogations this piece has explored the question why, in the 
face of the current and increasing terrorist threat in Europe, derogations have not on the whole 
been sought, so derogations have not played a pivotal role in the ‘war on terror’ in Europe. As 
discussed, reliance on such evasion may lead to protracted court action, continued tension with 
human rights law and an insidious undermining of respect for such law in the UK and 
elsewhere. Thus, art.15 is not fulfilling the role it was originally intended to have since it is 
either largely being side-lined in the ‘war on terror’, or misused as in Turkey at the present 
time.  
 
So this piece has put the case for the open use of derogations as opposed to the use of more 
covert methods of evading the impact of the ECHR (and ICCPR). It acknowledges that so 
doing could encourage the use of more repressive measures (so long as the demands of 
proportionality were met) and would not necessarily inhibit states from embracing the use of 
13 
 
measures such as citizenship-stripping, but at the least it asks that debate as to the role of art.15 
in the current situation, and in future, should be initiated.  
 
 
 
 
